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Scaling-up foreign aid: Will the ‘Big Push’ work?
Simon Feeny
SChool oF ECoNoMICS, FINANCE ANd MArkETING, rMIT UNIvErSITy
Mark McGillivray
AlFrEd dEAkIN rESEArCh INSTITUTE, dEAkIN UNIvErSITy
AbstrAct
International donors are substantially scaling up aid. At the same time, 
they have reservations over how much aid recipient countries can use 
effectively. Such concerns are supported by the aid effectiveness literature 
which finds that there are limits to the amounts of aid recipients can 
efficiently absorb. This paper demonstrates that a ‘big push’ in foreign aid 
will not lead to diminishing returns as long as donors get the inter-country 
allocation of aid right. This is true even if donors provide aid at levels equal 
to the well known target of 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income.
>  mark .mcgi l l ivray@deakin.edu.au
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IntroDuctIon
The now rather large aid effectiveness literature suggests that on average, foreign aid is effective 
at spurring economic growth in recipient countries (see McGillivray et al, 2006 for a recent survey).  
A consistent finding from the literature, however, is that the aid-growth relationship is subject to 
diminishing and eventually negative returns (see for example, Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001, Lensink 
and White, 2001, Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001, Hudson and Mosley, 2001, Dalgaard et al, 2004, 
Roodman, 2004 and Clemens et al, 2004). The finding demonstrates that there limits to the amounts 
of foreign aid that recipient countries can effectively absorb and, a doubling of aid to Africa (for 
example) would not double its impact (Collier, 2006).
This issue is of great importance given the dramatic scaling up of foreign aid being embarked upon 
by donors. Official Development Assistance (ODA), increased to an estimated record high of US$106 
billion in 2005 before falling slightly to about US$104 billion in 2006. ODA is expected to increase 
further to US$130 billion by 2010 (OECD, 2006a). In line with much of the aid effectiveness research, 
the international community has reservations that some countries might struggle to use additional 
aid flows effectively. It is imperative that the effectiveness of aid in promoting growth and reducing 
poverty is not impaired by over-aiding recipients relative to their absorptive capacities. 
Current orthodoxy on this issue within research and policy circles is that the inter-recipient 
allocation of aid should be such that it maximises its positive development impact in recipient 
countries. An efficient inter-recipient aid allocation is one that equalizes the marginal impact of 
aid across all recipients. In the unlikely event of donor budgets being sufficiently large, the total 
impact of aid is maximised globally if the marginal impact in all countries falls to zero. This is a basic 
message from the well-known Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) ‘poverty efficient’ aid allocation model. 
It is clear that the level of foreign aid that maximises per capita income  growth for a given aid 
budget is of huge importance to aid donors, if foreign aid is to be allocated in a manner to 
maximise its impact on growth, poverty reduction and progress towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  This paper uses the results from existing aid effectiveness 
studies to estimate the level of aid which maximises the rate of per capita income growth in 
recipient countries. Ideally aid effectiveness studies would reveal (directly) the relationship between 
aid and poverty reduction. Unfortunately, this is not the case since data relating to poverty are 
unreliable and not available for most countries. Estimates of the level of aid at which its incremental 
impact on recipient country growth diminishes vary, depending inter alia on the time period 
and sample of countries under consideration, but it typically seems that this occurs at around 
20 percent of recipient GDP. The paper terms this level of aid as the ‘growth efficient’ level. This 
paper examines the levels of aid which recipients currently receive and compares these levels 
to the growth efficient level. While recognising that donors have political and other motives and 
considerations in adjusting aid flows to developing countries, the paper examines the gains in per 
capita income growth that could be achieved if aid was allocated in accordance with a growth 
efficient aid allocation strategy subject to various world aid budgets. 
In adopting this approach, it becomes clear that some countries are seemingly over-aided. 16 
countries received, on average, aid at levels which exceed the growth efficient level during the 
period 2002-05. With the rise in global aid budgets many more countries are likely to be added to 
this list. If donors are concerned with using aid to maximise growth, they either need to cut back aid 
to these countries or very quickly work to increase their absorptive capacities. However, the main 
finding from this paper is that donors do not need to be concerned with diminishing returns to 
aid as long as they allocate aid according to a growth efficient strategy. This is true even if donors 
provide aid at levels equal to the well known target of 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income. 
discovery
application
excellence 7
This is true with a doubling of aid and even if donors provide aid at levels equal to the well known 
target of 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income (GNI). While this is clearly not an argument 
for not building capacity in developing countries, it is an argument for getting the inter-country 
allocation of aid right. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews the approach of the empirical 
aid effectiveness literature and examines the relationship between aid and per capita income 
growth. In Section III, the paper discusses the rise in global aid budgets. In Section IV, the paper 
obtains empirical estimates of growth efficient levels of aid and compares these levels to actual 
allocations in 2005. Section V concludes with the policy implications arising from the research. The 
appendix to this paper extends the analysis undertaken in Section II by examining the behavioural 
relationship between aid and the level of per capita income (in addition to growth in per capita 
income). 
the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth
The aid effectiveness has come a long way during the last decade, with researchers benefitting from 
larger datasets and more advanced econometric techniques. After many decades of ambiguous 
findings, virtually all studies during the course of the last ten years, have found that growth would 
be lower in the absence of aid.1 While this overall message from the literature is clear, disagreements 
over the environments in which aid works best remain and the process by which aid drives growth 
is still unclear.
Recent aid effectiveness studies have commonly allowed for a non-linear relationship between 
foreign aid and growth in their empirical models.  They typically estimate the following equation:
á â â â ì2 /1 2 3 1,...,i i i i ig a a Z i n= + + + + =                                     (1)
where gi is per capita GDP growth in aid receiving country i, ai is aid relative to GDP to that country, 
Zi is a vector of additional variables, μi is a residual, α is a constant and β1, β2 and β3 are coefficients. 
The vector of additional variables (Z) typically includes the initial level of GDP per capita, measures 
of ethnic fractionalization, the number of assassinations, institutional quality, macroeconomic 
policy indicators and region dummies. The expected signs of β1 and β2 are positive and negative, 
respectively. The hypothesized relationship between aid and growth described by (1), given these 
expectations, is diagrammatically represented in Figure 1 below.
The figure depicts the expected relationship between aid provided to a recipient (ai) and the 
growth in the recipient’s per capita income (gi). The incremental impact of foreign aid on growth 
is positive at all levels of aid up to ai*. This level is interpreted in the literature as the saturation 
level of aid, which corresponds to the unconstrained optimal level of aid according the poverty 
efficient approach. This paper terms this level the growth efficient level of foreign aid. The negative 
incremental impact on growth beyond this level of aid is rightly associated with absorptive capacity 
constraints within recipient countries. It is obvious from Figure 1 that if donors want to maximize gi, 
they should only provide aid up to and not beyond ai* in all countries.
 2
1 Rajan and Subramanian (2005) provide an exception. They find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship 
between aid and growth. This represents a minority finding with over 50 other recent studies concluding that aid is effective at 
spurring economic growth. 
2 Figure 1 takes the same form as the well-known Kuznets curve, representing the relationship between development and 
inequality. Kuznets is sometimes criticised for drawing the relationship from cross-sectional data rather than from time-series data. 
It is important to note that the relationship in Figure 1 is drawn from cross-sectional time-series (panel) data. Studies typically span 
the period from the late 1970s to 2001, with levels of aid to GDP remaining fairly constant over time. Although some studies have 
examined links between aid and growth using time series data for individual countries (see, for example, Gounder, 2001 and Feeny, 
2006). No evidence of diminishing returns between aid and growth is presented in these studies despite the strong theoretical 
grounds for the relationship. An explanation is that there is insufficient variation in aid flows over time around the threshold to 
empirically capture the relationship.
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There are a number of explanations underlying the diminishing returns relationship. The broad 
literature on aid points to many deficiencies in the delivery of aid which could restrict the 
capacity of recipients to productively absorb additional inflows. High levels of aid place a huge 
administrative burden on recipients with public sector officials facing excessive negotiation, 
management and reporting requirements. This is particularly true in the presence of a high level of 
donor proliferation. In the presence of many donors operating in many different sectors, aid projects 
and programmes are often uncoordinated and different reporting procedures will have to be 
adhered to. Other explanations relate to diminishing returns to investment/capital (which aid often 
funds) and Dutch disease effects whereby high levels of aid have an adverse impact on the export 
competitiveness of developing countries by causing an appreciation of the local currency.
FIgure 1: the IncrementAl ImpAct oF ForeIgn AID on economIc 
growth
 
From equation (1) it follows that:
                                                                      (2) 
                                                                            
The appendix to this paper examines the behavioural relationship between aid and income levels 
in addition to income growth. However, at this point it is important to recognise that the analysis 
relates to the impact of aid on economic growth rather than the overarching objective of foreign 
aid: which is poverty reduction. The paper notes that aid can influence many of the determinants 
of poverty and it follows that the level of aid that maximises its impact on poverty reduction is not 
necessarily that which maximises its impact on economic growth. Donors might, for example, want 
to target particularly poor groups in certain countries. They might also want to support particular 
public expenditures that have a pro-poor orientation. Such interventions might do a lot for poverty 
reduction, but might not be optimal in terms of current growth at the national level. As noted in the 
introduction, a paucity of data has prevented extensive examinations of the relationship between 
aid and poverty. Alternatively, donors might want to establish preconditions for growth and poverty 
reduction in periods later than the current one, on the grounds that growth in the short run might 
not be sustained over the long run. They might, for example, want to prevent a country sliding 
back into armed conflict. Donors might also want to rebuild physical and human infrastructure in 
countries in which these variables have reached a critically low level.
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The appendix to this paper examines the behavioural relationship between aid 
and income levels in addition to income growth. However, at this point it is important to 
recognise that the analysis relates to the impact of aid on economic growth rather than 
the overarching objective of foreign aid: which is poverty reducti n. The pap r not s that 
aid can influence many of the determinants of poverty and it follows that the level of aid
that maximises its impact on poverty reduction is not necessarily that which maximises 
its impact on economic growth. Donors might, for example, want to target particularly 
poor groups in certain countries. They might also want to support particular public 
expen itures that have a pro-poor orientation. Such interventions might do a lot for 
poverty r d ction, but might not be optimal in terms of current growth at the national 
level. As noted in the introduction, a paucity of data has prevented extensive 
examinations of the relationship between aid and poverty. Alternatively, donors might 
want to establish preconditions for growth and poverty reduction in periods later than the 
current one, on the grounds that growth in the short run might not be sustained over the 
long run. They might, for example, want to prevent a country sliding back into armed 
conflict. Donors might also want to rebuild physical and human infrastructure in 
countries in which these variables have reached a critically low level.
These recognitions provide recipient country-specific cases for allocating aid in 
excess of the growth efficient levels. Donors might have information on the relationship 
between aid and growth that is recipient country-specific. Recognising that the growth 
efficient levels depicted above are derived from average behavioural relationships, drawn 
from cross-country data, this provides a powerful, additional case for deviations from 
them. Given, however, that any deviation from growth efficient levels represents an
opportunity cost in terms of forgone current growth, donors would need to examine 
closely any large deviations if they are concerned with growth, seeking to ascertain 
whether they can be justified on valid poverty reduction criteria. 
Empirical research consistently finds that the relationship between aid and 
growth is U-shaped, with β1 and β2 being significantly different from zero and being 
positive and negatively, respectively. The actual level of ai* is obviously of huge 
importance to aid donors to ensure that their aid is effective. Table 1 provides the 
estimates of ai* from well-cited existing aid effectiveness studies.
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These recognitions provide recipient country-specific cases for allocating aid in excess of the 
growth efficient levels. Donors might have information on the relationship between aid and 
growth that is recipient country-specific. Recognising that the growth efficient levels depicted 
above are derived from average behavioural relationships, drawn from cross-country data, this 
provides a powerful, additional case for deviations from them. Given, however, that any deviation 
from growth efficient levels represents an opportunity cost in terms of forgone current growth, 
donors would need to examine closely any large deviations if they are concerned with growth, 
seeking to ascertain whether they can be justified on valid poverty reduction criteria. 
Empirical research consistently finds that the relationship between aid and growth is U-shaped, 
with β1 and β2 being significantly different from zero and being positive and negatively, 
respectively. The actual level of ai* is obviously of huge importance to aid donors to ensure that 
their aid is effective. Table 1 provides the estimates of ai* from well-cited existing aid effectiveness 
studies. 
tAble 1: estImAtes oF growth AnD Income eFFIcIent AID From 
prevIous stuDIes
Study β1 β2 ai*
Durbarry et al (1998) 0.119 -0.001 41.9
Hansen and Tarp (2000) 0.207 -0.004 24.0
Hansen and Tarp (2001) 0.199 -0.606 17.0
Lensink and White (2001) 0.174 -0.002 49.6
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) 1.340 -0.127 5.3
Hudson and Mosley (2001) 0.815 -0.056 6.7
Dalgaard et al (2004) 1.910 -0.115 4.8
Roodman (2004) 0.385 -0.010 19.3
Clemens et al (2004) 0.960 -0.059 18.1
Average 20.74
Notes: Coefficients are based on average coefficients reported in the studies. Estimates of ai* are based on total 
foreign aid and are adjusted if the study includes an aid interaction term. Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard 
et al (2004) use Effective Development Assistance (EDA) as the measure of aid. EDA is the sum of aid grants and 
the grant equivalent of aid loans. All other studies use Official Development Assistance (ODA). Further details are 
provided in Table A1 in the appendix.
Table 1 shows considerable variation in the estimates of ai*. This is not surprising given the 
different datasets, time periods and econometric techniques used by researchers. For the analysis 
undertaken in this paper we take an average. There is no reason to assume that one study has more 
accurately estimated the diminishing returns relationship than other studies. The average value of 
ai*, the level of aid to GDP which maximizes growth is 20.74 per cent.
3 The lowest estimates of ai* 
are from studies using EDA as the measure of aid rather than the traditional measure (ODA). Note 
that if these studies are omitted from the analysis the average estimate of ai* is higher and even 
fewer countries would be receiving levels of aid in excess of the growth efficient levels. The upper 
and lower bounds of a 95 per cent confidence interval around our estimate of ai* are 15.3 and 26.2 
per cent. The implications of this range in estimates are discussed further below.
3 A similar estimate of ai* is obtained if we take a trimmed mean, omitting the largest and smallest values. These values are closest to 
those reported by Hansen and Tarp (2000). Therefore the coefficients used in calculating the impact of aid on growth are taken from 
one of their regressions: β1 = 0.165 and β2=-0.004. The lowest estimates of ai* are from studies using EDA as the measure of aid. Note 
that if these studies are omitted from our analysis the average estimate of ai* is higher and even fewer countries would be receiving 
levels of aid in excess of the growth efficient levels.
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global aid budgets
While international aid donors have started scaling up their aid programs, there is some uncertainty 
over the level that global flows will increase to. At the International Conference on Financing for 
Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, a number of governments reasserted the 
commitment for donor countries to achieve an ODA to GNI target of 0.7 per cent. This level of aid 
has been a long standing development target. The United Nations Millennium Project calculates 
that if countries follow through on their commitments to increase aid to this level, the MDGs could 
be achieved by 2015. However, while some donors have already exceeded the 0.7 target other 
donors have failed to fully commit to the target despite pledging to increase their level of aid. 
Figure 2 plots the level of ODA in real US dollar amounts provided by members of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1990. The figure shows that although aid flows 
fell slightly during the first half of the 1990s, since 1997, the level of ODA has steadily increased to 
almost $80 billion in 2004. Further, the OECD projects that ODA is likely to amount to $130 billion in 
2010 (based on recent pledges by donors). This implies that aid flows will have more than doubled 
since 1997. Foreign aid flows from non-OECD members are also likely to increase substantially 
during the next decade. This paper undertakes a number of simulations to examine whether the 
scaling up of aid will induce diminishing returns and hamper its effectiveness.
FIgure 2: oDA From the oecD countrIes 1990 to 2010
Source: OECD (2006a)
Inter-country allocation of foreign aid
Table A2 in the appendix to the paper shows the difference between the level of aid (on average) 
that countries received during the period 2002-05 and ai*. It also provides the impact of aid on 
growth and amount of additional growth that could be achieved if the level of aid was increased/
decreased to ai*. On average, countries receive a level of aid which accounts for 8.9 per cent of GDP, 
a level much lower than the growth efficient level. The vast majority of countries listed in Table A2 
can receive substantially larger amounts of aid without negative growth returns setting in. However, 
16 countries receive aid at levels higher than ai*. Ten of these countries are located in Africa, four 
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in the Pacific and two in Asia. Two of these countries (Malawi and Rwanda) would no longer be 
classified as ‘over-aided’ if we used the upper estimate of ai* within the 95 per cent confidence 
interval while a further ten countries would be included if we used the lower estimate.
Table A2 also indicates that when aid is provided at growth efficient levels, its marginal impact on 
economic growth is 1.7 per cent. The incremental impact of aid on growth would be an average 1.1 
per cent higher if aid allocations were equal to ai*. The largest gains would be achieved by scaling 
back aid to those countries with levels currently exceeding ai*. 
It is possible to execute some simple simulations of the growth impact of increasing foreign aid. 
All simulations assume that the inter-country allocation of foreign aid remains the same. If we 
assume that developing country GDP remained unchanged but doubled the amount of foreign 
aid to each recipient (from 2002-05 levels) then a total of 41 countries would receive levels of aid 
exceeding growth efficient aid. Results are provided in column 8 of Table A2. Note that increasing 
aid to this level implies a larger total aid budget than the US$130 billion project by the OECD for 
2010. Moreover, if we assume that all DAC donors provided 0.7 per cent of GNI in aid and allocated 
the same proportion of this aid to each developing country recipient, a total of 49 countries could 
be deemed over-aided4. A summary of these scenarios and how many countries will become over-
aided are provided in Table 2 below. The implication of using the lower and upper bound estimates 
of a* are also provided. Clearly, unless donors consider absorptive capacity constraints when scaling 
up, diminishing returns to aid will be experienced in a large number of countries.  The table also 
shows how large aid flows would be if they were allocated according to a growth efficient strategy 
and scaled up to account for 20 per cent of GDP in all developing countries.
tAble 2: scAlIng up ForeIgn AID – key results
Global aid budget Value of ODA  
(US$, billions)
Number of over-aided 
countries (ai> ai*)
ODA- 2002-05 level
Lower bound ai*
Upper bound ai*
78.5 16
26
14
Doubling aid (from 2002-05 level)
Lower bound ai*
Upper bound ai*
157 41
49
30
ODA 0.7% of DAC GNI
Lower bound ai*
Upper bound ai*
207 49
62
42
ODA if all recipients receive ai* 
ODA if all recipients receive ai* 
(excluding China and India)
1,466 
922
-
-
The clear message from this analysis is that aid flows can increase dramatically with large returns 
in terms of growth and poverty reduction. In fact aid flows can increase to levels far in excess of 
those implied by an outright doubling of aid, or where it accounts for 0.7 per cent of donor GNI and 
still not necessarily lead to diminishing returns. ODA would need to increase to US$1,466 billion 
to account for 20 per cent of GDP in all developing countries. The figure falls to US$922 billion if 
China and India are excluded from the calculation. This figure is still far higher than the levels of aid 
currently being called for by pressure groups, think-tanks and international organisations. 
4 DAC countries provided, an average of 0.265 per cent of their GNI in ODA during the period 2002-05.
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
12 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
The paper recognises such levels are unpractical and that donors should not strive to scale up aid 
to such an extent in many countries. However, undertaking this exercise does indicate that aid 
flows could increase dramatically without leading to diminishing returns in recipient countries if 
they were allocated according to a growth efficient strategy. This is true even if we use our lower 
confidence bound estimate of ai* as the growth efficient level of foreign aid.
conclusion and policy recommendations 
This paper indicates that aid budgets can increase dramatically without inducing diminishing 
returns on per capita income growth. Therefore a ‘big push’ in foreign aid levels can lead to 
important increases in economic growth and reductions in poverty. This is one of the main points 
of the paper. The other is of the importance of getting the inter-recipient allocation of aid right. 
The paper demonstrates that aid flows can increase to levels far more than any currently being 
proposed and still not induce diminishing returns if it is allocated across recipients up to the point 
where its marginal impact on growth is zero. However, this should not be used as an argument 
against donors increasing the efficiency of foreign by working towards the Paris Declaration 
principles and improving the absorptive capacity of aid recipients.
Specifically, using findings from well-cited existing studies, the paper estimates that the level of aid 
which maximises per capita income growth in recipient countries is when it accounts for 20.7 per 
cent of a recipient’s GDP. This level of aid is termed the growth efficient level. The paper identifies 
16 developing countries which received average aid levels which exceed the growth efficient level 
during the period 2202-05. Donors should be aware that reducing aid to these recipients could 
yield higher marginal impact on per capita income growth. This needs be supplemented with 
country–specific information and the current environment in which the aid program operates. If 
countries are clearly receiving levels of foreign aid that cannot be reasonably justified, donors could 
reduce the level of aid that they disburse to the recipient or use their aid to quickly increase the 
capacity of the recipient.5 
The paper notes, however, that the estimates is provides should only be used as a rough guide 
for aid donors. Econometric models estimate relationships that apply on average across countries. 
It is also true that different types of foreign aid are likely to have different impacts and different 
thresholds with regard to economic growth. A better knowledge of these impacts will help inform 
donors of the correct mix when scaling up foreign aid amounts. 
5 For example, with the exception of the Marshall Islands, all countries which received aid at levels in excess of the income efficient 
level in 2004, have recently experienced periods of civil unrest. Larger amounts of aid could be reasonably justified in these 
circumstances.
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AppenDIx
A key issue is whether the relationship depicted in Figure 1 is between foreign aid and short or long 
run per capita income growth. Theoretical growth models predict that foreign aid can impact on 
both short and long run growth.  Early growth models (for example Harrod-Domar, 1946, Solow 
Swan, 1956) predict that aid impacts on short run growth by increasing the rate of savings. This will 
lead to an increase in the steady state income level. However these models (as well as the more 
recent endogenous growth models such as Romer, 1986, Lucas, 1988) recognise that foreign aid 
can impact on long run growth if it impacts on the level of technology or productivity. For example 
if foreign aid increases human capital, includes technically superior imports and learning by doing 
externalities, it can increase the long run growth rate.
The issue has important implications regarding the impact of foreign aid on income levels as 
well as on income growth. While the relationship between aid and per capita income growth is 
important,  what is more important for reducing the number of people living in poverty (for given 
poverty-income elasticities), is to maximize the level of GDP per capita within country i. If the 
relationship between aid and long run economic growth is assumed to that depicted in Figure 1, 
the corresponding relationship between aid and the level of per capita income (yi) is provided in the 
second half of Figure A1 below. The level of aid that maximises per capita income is ai**. The paper 
terms this level of aid as the income efficient level. At this level the impact of aid on the rate of 
growth approaches zero. Clearly, while the incremental efficiency of aid on growth falls continually 
for all levels greater than ai*, aid remains effective, increasing the level of per capita GDP, up to ai**. 
It is evident from Figure A1 that the income efficient amount of aid is twice the growth efficient 
amount. The important implication from this analysis is that if the estimated aid growth 
relationships provided in the literature can be interpreted as depicting a long-run equilibrium, 
donors wanting to maximize per capita incomes in recipient countries are able to provide far higher 
levels of foreign aid than previously thought. Donors should quickly increase aid to recipients up to 
the level that maximizes growth (ai*) and then steadily and incrementally increase it up to the level 
that maximizes the level of GDP per capita (ai**).  Rapidly increasing aid levels to ai** is unlikely to 
work. It is important for donors to gradually increase the level of aid for aid recipients to experience 
all of the benefits from aid.
discovery
application
excellence 15
- 14 -
Figure A1: Aid, Economic Growth and Per Capita Income
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From equation (1) recall that:
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−
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Table A1: Detailed Estimates of Growth and Income Efficient Aid from 
Previous Studies
Study and Estimation Technique β1 β2 ai*
Durbarry et al (1998)
Table 2: Two-way fixed effects model (OLS) 0.176 -0.002 44.8
Table 3: GLS with regional dummies (GLS) 0.101 -0.001 41.0
Appendix 1 Table 2: One-way fixed effects model (OLS) 0.105 -0.001 41.0
Appendix 3 Table 2: Two-way random effects (GLS) 0.094 -0.001 40.6
Average 0.119 -0.001 41.9
Hansen and Tarp (2000)
Table 4, Column 3 (OLS) 0.166 -0.003 27.7
Table 4, Column 4 (OLS) 0.165 -0.004 20.6
Table 4, Column 5 (OLS) 0.182 -0.004 22.8
Appendix B Column 3 (IV) 0.236 -0.005 23.6
Appendix B Column 4 (IV) 0.230 -0.005 23.0
Appendix B Column 5 (IV) 0.265 -0.005 26.5
Average 0.207 -0.004 24.0
Hansen and Tarp (2001)
Table 1, Column 1.1 (IV) 0.238 -0.754 15.8
Table 1, Column 1.2 (IV) 0.241 -0.763 15.8
Table 3, Column 3.1 fixed effects (OLS) 0.117 -0.301 19.4
Average 0.199 -0.606 17.0
Lensink and White (2001)
Table 10, extreme bounds analysis (OLS) 0.174 -0.002 49.6
Average 0.174 -0.002 49.6
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001)
Table 4, Column 7 (IV) 1.327 -0.126 5.3
Table 4, Column 8 (IV) 1.352 -0.127 5.3
Average 1.340 -0.127 5.3
Hudson and Mosley (2001)
Table 4, Column 1, (2SLS) 0.541 -0.039 6.8
Table 4, Column 2, (WLS) 1.155 -0.068 8.5
Table 4, Column 3, (2SLS) 0.950 -0.058 6.5
Table 4, Column 4, (2SLS) 0.612 -0.060 5.1
Average 0.815 -0.056 6.7
Dalgaard et al (2004)
Table 1, Column 3 (2SLS) 1.350 -0.130 5.2
Table 1, Column 6 (2SLS) 2.470 -0.100 4.3
Average 1.910 -0.115 4.8
Roodman (2004)
Table 4: Reproduction pf Hansen and Tarp (2001) (2SLS) 0.250 -0.010 12.5
Table 12, With population included (2SLS) 0.520 -0.010 26.0
Average 0.385 -0.010 19.3
Clemens et al (2004)
Table 4, Column 5 (2SLS) 0.960 -0.059 18.1
Average 0.960 -0.059 18.1
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